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To: Barry Harrelson **Date:** March 31, 1997
Fax #: 703-613-3060 **Pages:** 17, including this cover sheet.
From: Michelle Combs
Subject: DS&T and DO Briefing Questions

COMMENTS:**Barry,**

Attached are the final versions of the DS&T and DO briefing questions. There are no changes in the DS&T questions. Questions have been added to the DO list to reflect our conversation March 19 and 20. You, of course, already have our detailed explanations for the earlier DO questions. If you have any questions or if there are any problems, please give me a call. I should be in all day. See you tomorrow.

Michelle

HTLINGUAL

1. What kinds of records might the DS&T maintain on the HTLINGUAL project? How could these records be queried?

Castro Assassination Plots

1. What kinds of records would TSD or other offices of DS&T have maintained on the various Castro assassination plots? How might a search query be framed to isolate these records?

SKUNK WORKS


A Personal Memoir of My Years at Lockheed

BEN R. RICH AND LEO JANOS



LITTLE, BROWN AND COMPANY

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OVERFLYING RUSSIA

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The next thing we tried was something called a Salisbury screen, a metallic grid applied to the airplane's undercarriage in the hope of deflecting incoming radar beams, but it worked only at some frequencies and altitudes and not at others.

Kelly thought it was more practical to try special iron ferrite paints that would absorb a radar ping rather than bounce it back to the sender. The paints were moderately effective but inhibited heat dissipation through the airframe's outer skin and we experienced overheating engine problems. But the paint lowered the radar cross section by one order of magnitude, so we decided to give it a try. We called these specially painted airplanes "dirty birds" and shipped the first one out for flight testing in April 1957. Our test pilot, Bob Slesker, took the U-2 up to over seventy thousand feet and suddenly radioed that he was experiencing rapid airframe heat buildup. Moments later his engine blew out and the faceplate blew off Bob's oxygen mask as his pressure suit instantly inflated. The U-2 dove straight down and crashed. It took us three days to locate the wreckage and Bob's body. An autopsy revealed that above seventy thousand feet he had suffered acute hypoxia and lost consciousness in only ten seconds. The culprit that killed him was a defective faceplate clasp that cost fifty cents.

The CIA was so desperate to buy time for these Soviet overflights that Bissell got Kelly to sequester four of our test flight engineers and have them write a bogus flight manual for a U-2 twice as heavy as ours and with a maximum altitude of only fifty thousand feet that carried only scientific weather gear in its bay. The manual included phony instrument panel photos with altered markings for speed, altitude, and load factor limits. Four copies were produced and then artificially aged with grease, coffee stains, and cigarette burns. How or if the agency got them into Soviet hands only Mr. B knew, and he never told.

**Questions for Follow-up DO Records Briefing
April 1, 1997**

1. At what point did the DDP begin to keep records of destroyed records? For example, in a Cold Warrior footnote, Tom Mangold reports that as any of Angleton's files were destroyed, "a complete record was carefully maintained about what had been done. (George) Kalaris signed off on every file and the DCI's office was notified." (p. 143) Where are these records?
2. Could an archival search be run on specific topics for retired records at the CIA's Record's Center? Perhaps an ARRB staffer could be present during the search to review the abstracts and to suggest other fields or topics to be searched?
3. Could a crypt search for records containing relevant crypts be run through cryptographic reference? How would queries need to be framed and stated?
4. Why is it so difficult to develop a list for all personnel (official, contract, administrative, or TDY) assigned to the post referenced in RIF 104-10065-10199 from 1959-1964?
5. We have been working to identify all technical and surveillance operations in and on the Cuban and Soviet consulates and embassies in Mexico City between September 1 and December 1, 1963. How can we frame a search query to determine if we have a comprehensive and complete list of all operations at that time?
6. How can a search query be framed to document all electronic take produced by the Mexico City Station in the immediate wake of the assassination (the first month) and during the period of Oswald's visit? How can we verify that what exists in the Sequestered Collection represents all records of the technical production that was available at the time of the assassination? If additional records or original production still exists, where would it be stored or filed? What searches could be conducted to retrieve any additional records? If such electronic take has been destroyed, do records exist of the destruction?
7. Could you describe the process by which operational funds are proposed, approved, received, and distributed (circa 1963). What funding and disbursement records exist? How are they organized? How should a request be formulated to institute a reasonable search of these records?

8. We have seen DDP monthly operational reports which contain information on the allocation/distribution of operational funds. Are there other DDP records which would reflect how certain projects utilized their funding? How are these records organized? How should a search query be framed?

9. Various open sources have linked the CIA to various journalists and publishing companies during the 1960's. How should a query be framed to search for connections between the Agency and journalists or publishing companies?

10. Did the Agency have any relationship, projects, or contacts with publishing houses during the time of the assassination and in the aftermath of the Warren Commission? How would a search be formulated to determine whether or not the Agency had a relationship with any of the same publishing houses that were also publishing books about the assassination?

11. How would a query be framed to search for files on any office or person dealing with organized crime and Cuba? How should a request be formulated to institute a reasonable search on this topic?

12. Is there a comprehensive record or list detailing the identities of individuals on the Interagency Source Register? How are these records organized? How can a search query be framed to ascertain whether or not a particular individual appears in the Register.

13. How could a search query be framed to ascertain whether or not a particular individual was given access to classified information by DCD (then OO)? What kind of files are assembled in the process of clearing non-Agency contacts/sources for access to classified information?

14. ARRB's Request for Additional Information and Record No. CIA-13, dated November 1, 1996, contained the following questions:

- A. What forms of backchannel communications were there between the Mexico City Station (including the COS), JMWAVE, or Headquarters during 1963? By "backchannel" we mean, *inter alia*, any administrative, senior staff, or restricted access communications, or any written or electronic communications other than regular cables or dispatches (of the type included in the JFK Collection).
- B. Were there, in fact, any backchannel communications between the Mexico City Station (including the COS), JMWAVE, or Headquarters during the time periods 27 Sept - 16 Oct 1963 and 22 Nov - 30 Nov 1963?

- C. To the extent that there were any backchannel communications for the time periods 27 Sept - 16 Oct 1963 and 22 Nov - 30 Nov 1963 (other than those currently contained in the JFK Collection), please make such records available for review.

Why has it been so difficult to answer these questions?

15. ARRB's Request for Additional Information and Record No. CIA-14, dated December 23, 1996, documented our request for the annual or biannual Station reports for Mexico City Station for 1963 and 1964. Why has it been so difficult to provide these reports?

16. The attached Agency document released in 1996 contains the paragraph:

11. A memorandum marked only for file, 16 March 1967, signed M.D. Stevens, says that J. Monroe SULLIVAN, #280207, was granted a covert security approval on 10 December 1962 so that he could be used in Project QKENCHANT. (Clay) Shaw has # 402897-A.

What do these numbers mean? What does the "A" at the ends of Shaw's number signify? Do the files identified by these numbers still exist? Why was Sullivan granted a covert security approval?

17. During the period 1959-1963, what was the purpose or goal of QKENCHANT?

18. Under what circumstances were non-agency employees given covert security clearances for the QKENCHANT project?

19. Did Clay Shaw receive a covert security approval for the QKENCHANT project? Why was one needed? Did Clay Shaw receive covert security clearances for any project other than QKENCHANT

20. What did Clay Shaw do within the QKENCHANT project?

21. Do records exist to account for the disposition of all files on Clay Shaw?

22. Did Howard Hunt have any involvement with the QKENCHANT project prior to 1964?

23. Did J. Monroe Sullivan have any involvement with the QKENCHANT project prior to 1964?

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24. The DO telephone directories list an Operational Services/Defector Staff beginning in October 1959? What was the Defector Staff? Did it have an operational component?

25. In the period 1959-1964, were DO officers, selected to serve overseas [redacted]

[redacted] legally considered to be [redacted]
[redacted]

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DECLASSIFIED PER E.O. 102-546 (JFK ACT)
 NARA SL DATE 2/4/97

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
 Release As Sanitized
 1998

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a relatively clean, easy-to-read specimen of what we already have.

Note: only redaction is QK (what CIA calls a Digraph) from QK ZWCHANO on page 4 here paragraph 11.

Enclosure 21

I've included a poor copy of page 4 that contains the QK.

SUBJECT: Clay L. SHAW (201-813493).

1. Subject was born on 17 March 1913 in New Orleans, Louisiana.

2. Standard background information on Subject (parents, marital status, records of education and employment, etc.) is lacking because SHAW was a contact of the Domestic Contact Service.

3. Traces on Subject have been run in RID/Main Index, the index of the Office of Security and the Central Cover Staff. The first showed only a 1951 FBI interview with SHAW about a former employee of the New Orleans International Trade Mart. The second showed that OO/Contacts Division had requested a name trace; about 1949 and that the check of FBI records then conducted was negative. Central Cover Staff had no record.

4. Some of the OO-B reports based on SHAW's reporting are on hand. They are the following. (It is noted that the source description identifies the source by job title.)

- a. OO-B 47958, 26 March 1952, concerns a letter written to the public relations director of the International Trade Mart by one Dr. Jutta SCHALLER, a trade consultant to the Bonn Government. The letter is a follow-up of discussions held in New Orleans during December 1951. The letter said that Soviet production and export trade were being advertised and

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Document Number

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for FOIA Review on

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promoted by West German money. The publication Wer Liefert Was?, published in Leipzig, is now also being published in Hamburg, at a price much lower than competitive volumes.

- b. 00-B-9381, 27 December 1948. Information acquired 18 December 1948. SHAW (identified by job title) has agreed to lease to the CSR government 1,000 feet of space for a display of merchandise in New Orleans. The lease is for one year, starting 1 April 1949.
- c. 00-B-4933-49, 14 June 1949, information data late April and early May 1949. Results of a trip SHAW made in March through May 1949 in West Indies, Central America, and Northern South America.
- d. 00-B-4934-49, 14 June 1949, same general subject and background as above.
- e. 00-B-4935-49, 14 June 1949, as above.
- f. 00-B-35477, 29 June 1951. Results of a SHAW trip in 1951 in Central and South America and the Caribbean area.

5. On 9 May 1961 General C. P. Cabell, then DDCI, addressed the Foreign Policy Association of New Orleans. It is believed that he was introduced by Clay SHAW.

6. On 3 March 1967 the Washington Star reported that Garrison had arrested SHAW and had made public charges that SHAW, FERRIE, OSWALD, and others had plotted the assassination in the apartment of FERRIE at 3300 Louisiana Parkway, New Orleans. SHAW has said that he never saw OSWALD. He denies having used the name Clay BERTRAND. Jack S. MARTIN said that FERRIE had mentioned

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SHAW to him. J. Monroe SULLIVAN, executive director of the San Francisco World Trade Center, told the Associated Press that SHAW was in San Francisco and touring the Center with him on the day of the assassination. SHAW, now retired, was formerly the managing director of the International Trade Mart in New Orleans. He is 54 years old. Ramsey Clark, U.S. Attorney General, said that the FBI had investigated SHAW late in 1963. "On the evidence that the FBI has, there was no connection found" with the assassination.

7. Memorandum No. 84-67, 3 March 1967, from Chief, New Orleans Office, to Director, Domestic Contact Service, re SHAW.

- a. The first contact of the New Orleans office of the DCS with Clay SHAW occurred in December 1948. A name check request was returned "no info" on 23 March 1949. SHAW was contacted by Mr. Hunter Leake of the New Orleans office seven times in 1949, twice in 1950, five times in 1951, nine times in 1952, once in 1953, twice in 1954, twice in 1955, and twice in 1956. SHAW is the source of eight 00-B reports submitted by the New Orleans office. At one time he had the "Y" number 145.1. The last contact took place on 25 May 1956. On 23 January 1967 Jack S. MARTIN phoned the New Orleans office, said that he was working on an important undercover deal for Garrison and Detective Louis IVON, and was calling at IVON's request. He was calling to ask the head of the CIA office to telephone IVON on his unlisted number. No such call was made. The writer, Lloyd A. Ray, asks that the General Counsel be informed and that he provide advice.

8. Undated and unsigned memorandum (probably produced by CI/R & A). The following additional information was provided by the New Orleans office of DCS.

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REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

Since 25 May 1956 Mr. [Hushamstsky] had seen SHAW casually, by chance, in various downtown New Orleans restaurants, and greetings were exchanged. The last such casual encounter was just before SHAW's retirement in 1965.

9. On 7 March 1967 Pravda published an article called "Clay Shaw of the CIA" datelined Rome, 6 March 1967, written by V. YEREMKOV. The article charged that CIA made use of the services of Clay SHAW for CIA's own interests in Italy. The Pravda piece notes that the DA in New Orleans is accusing SHAW of participation in the assassination conspiracy. It says SHAW spent "some years" in Rome as a World Trade Center leader. It claims that the Center was a cover for financing anti-Communist activity. CIA gave directives to SHAW. The World Trade Center was a branch of "Pamiden" (sic), "which the newspapers in Switzerland openly accused of 'criminal operations'...." (Comments: It appears that all of the Pravda charges are untrue, except that there was a CIA-SHAW relationship. So far as is known, SHAW was never asked to use his relationship with the World Trade Center for clandestine purposes and, in fact, he has not been in Italy.)

10. Memorandum from [redacted] to [redacted] 8 March 1967, subject: Italian Aspects of the Clay SHAW Affair. The Corriere della Sera of 5 March 1967 has an article about SHAW, the assassination, and the World Trade Center. Contains no relevant information.

11. A memorandum marked only for file, 16 March 1967, signed [redacted] Stevens, says that J. Monroe SULLIVAN, #280207, was granted a covert security approval on 10 December 1962 so that he could be used in Project CURECHANT. SHAW has #402097-1.

12. Memorandum from [redacted] to [redacted] 24 March 1967, subject: "Trace Reverts on Persons Connected with Centro Mondiale Commerciale" (World Trade Center), filed [redacted] folder, Clay SHAW -- working papers.

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RELEASED PER P.L. 102-586 (JFK ACT)
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better copy.
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Since 25 May 1956 Mr. Hunter Leake had seen SHAW casually, by chance, in various downtown New Orleans restaurants, and greetings were exchanged. The last such casual encounter was just before SHAW's retirement in 1965.

9. On 7 March 1967 Pravda published an article called "Clay Shaw of the CIA" datelined Rome, 6 March 1967, written by V. YERMAKOV. The article charged that CIA made use of the services of Clay SHAW for CIA's own interests in Italy. The Pravda piece notes that the DA in New Orleans is accusing SHAW of participation in the assassination conspiracy. It says SHAW spent "some years" in Rome as a World Trade Center leader. It claims that the Center was a cover for financing anti-Communist activity. CIA gave directives to SHAW. The World Trade Center was a branch of "Permidex" (sic), "which the newspapers in Switzerland openly accused of 'criminal operations'...." (Comment: It appears that all of the Pravda charges are untrue, except that there was a CIA-SHAW relationship. So far as is known, SHAW was never asked to use his relationship with the World Trade Center for clandestine purposes and, in fact, he has not been in Italy.)

10. Memorandum from C/EUR/I to C/CI/R & A, 8 March 1967 subject: Italian Aspects of the Clay Shaw Affair. The Corriere della Sera of 5 March 1967 has an article about SHAW, the assassination, and the World Trade Center. Contains no relevant information.

11. A memorandum marked only for file, 16 March 1967, signed M.D. Stevens, says that J. Monroe SULLIVAN, #280207, was granted a covert security approval on 10 December 1962 so that he could be used in Project TENCHANT. SHAW has #402897-A.

12. Memorandum from C/EUR/I to C/CI/R & A, 24 March 1967, Subject: "Trace Results on Persons Connected with Centro Mondiale Commerciale" (World Trade Center), filed CI/R & A folder, Clay SHAW - working papers.

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- a. The 5 March 1967 issue of Il Messaggero links SHAW with the World Trade Center. Others linked to the center were traced, with results reported in this memorandum. No relationship to the Garrison investigation appears here. A report on "Farmidex", a Swiss corporation with principal offices in Rome, is also in the file because the World Trade Center and Farmidex are associated. Again, there is no information here which relates significantly to the case Garrison is trying to build in New Orleans.
13. The Washington Post, Outlook, 2 April 1967, "Seeking Truth in New Orleans in the Middle of the Night", George Lardner, Jr.
- a. Garrison's men drove RUSSO to SHAW's French Quarter home. RUSSO posed as a Mutual of Omaha salesman. He knocked at door; SHAW answered. RUSSO said that he was Clem BERTRAND.
- b. SHAW is a 54-year old bachelor and socialite who pioneered the 33-story International Trade Mart in New Orleans. He was subpoenaed by Garrison's office on 1 March 1967. According to his friends, his questioners did not advise him of his rights. They told him they had evidence of a meeting with FERRIE and OSWALD. There was a fuss and SHAW was arrested and booked on conspiracy to murder JFK. That night Garrison's men raided SHAW's apartment and confiscated whips, chains, a black net cap, a cape and hood. RUSSO told reporters that he did not know Clay SHAW, but he identified the man arrested by Garrison as Clem BERTRAND.

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Mr. CHAYES. No; I think in each case it will depend so much on the situation with the particular person. If a person comes in and he is very agitated or something of that kind, it might dictate a totally different approach than a different kind of thing.

Mr. DULLES. Wouldn't it be useful though to give—I don't want to suggest what the Secretary of State should do in this, but in the light of this experience, would there not be some benefit possibly in giving people in the field the result of the experience gained in this particular case?

Mr. CHAYES. Well, the general approach, and other matters related to it, are touched on in orientation courses for consular officers and so on. I think as I look on Consul Snyder's actions, that he behaved very much like a responsible Foreign Service officer.

That happened long before I was in the Department, so I can say that without any involvement. But it seemed to me that he did just what he should have done, despite the unfortunate aftermath. And it shows to me, at least, that the training and orientation that these people are getting is right, is serviceable, and they are able to handle these situations as they come in.

Mr. DULLES. I realize that you ought not to prescribe hard and fast rules, that there is a broad range of discretion that should be exercised here. But I just raise the question as to whether a good deal of experience hasn't been gained in this case in that very field.

Mr. CHAYES. Well, it may very well be that more attention to that particular aspect should be given in the orientation courses and so on. Those things tend to reflect what is hot at the moment you know, and if you haven't had trouble with something for a pretty long time, it tends maybe not to get mentioned.

Representative FORD. If Oswald had persisted that day, October 31, in demanding the form that is a prerequisite under your definition for renunciation, would Snyder have been required to give it to him and permit him to sign it?

Mr. CHAYES. I think if it had been in ordinary office hours when the consulate was open for business, and if Snyder was satisfied that he was competent, that Oswald was competent, he would have to give him the form, yes, sir.

Representative FORD. Does Snyder have the authority to make a determination of competency?

Mr. CHAYES. No; he doesn't have the authority to make a determination of competence, and I suppose it is possible at some point to get the issue tried in court. But I think a consular officer would probably be acting within his discretion if he saw somebody who was drunk or raving or something and just said, "Well, I am not going to give you this until I am sure that your action is your act." After all, when the consul accepts the oath, he is certifying that it is the act of the person in a meaningful sense, and so if he thought that the person was incompetent, I think he would have discretion not to give the oath. But I put that far aside because in the particular case here, Mr. Snyder made it perfectly clear that he had no reason to doubt that Oswald was fully competent.

And so if Oswald had been there at a time when the office was open, or had returned at a time when the office was open, and had persisted in his demand, I think Snyder would have been under an obligation to give him the form.

Representative FORD. The only technical reason or basis upon which Snyder could have denied Oswald the right that day was the fact that it was on a Saturday, a non-working-hour period of the Embassy.

Mr. CHAYES. Yes; I think he had every right to try to dissuade him, or persuade him not to act or persuade him to think it over and come back the next day. But if after all of that Oswald still had said "But I want to do it now" and if the office was open for business, then I think he would have had to do it.

Mr. DULLES. I think it might be useful if it has not been done to introduce at this point as an exhibit the form of oath of renunciation. Here is the formalized oath and I think it would be well to have this in our records unless it is already in our records.

Representative FORD. I agree.

Mr. COLEMAN. No; it isn't. Could we say it will be marked as Commission Exhibit No. 855 and place this sticker on that page, photostat it and then just send it back?

(Commission Exhibit No. 855 was marked for identification and received in evidence.)

Representative FORD. When Oswald came back on November 3, I believe, which was a regular working day—

Mr. COLEMAN. Mr. Commissioner, he did not come back on November 3. He merely wrote a letter.

Mr. CHAYES. Wrote a letter. He never came back.

Representative FORD. Are all of the employees, Mr. Snyder, Mr. McVickar, and the others who had any firsthand contact with the Oswald case in this area, were they State Department employees?

Mr. CHAYES. Yes, sir; these two men who were the only ones who did see him directly, I think the secretary, their secretary also saw him, but had nothing to do with him except as a receptionist. These two men were Foreign Service officers and are now Foreign Service officers.

Representative FORD. In the strictest term.

Mr. CHAYES. Yes, sir; members of the Foreign Service, appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.

Representative FORD. Could you tell us in a bit more detail the process that you followed or the procedure that you carried out when you first got into the Oswald case.

You mentioned yesterday you got a call or you were directed by I believe the Secretary of State or by somebody in higher authority to take certain steps. Will you tell us who called you, what you did in the first 3 or 4 days?

Mr. CHAYES. It was the evening of the day, perhaps about 5 o'clock on the day of the assassination. It may have been somewhat earlier, because I think I remember I went home for an hour and then came back to carry out this assignment. Mr. Ball, once it became known that Oswald had some history as a defector— George W. Ball —

Mr. DULLES. Ball is the Under Secretary of State.

Mr. CHAYES. He was then the Acting Secretary because the Secretary of State as you recall was on a plane over the Pacific. So he was the Acting Secretary. But even if he had been the Under Secretary he is my client.

Representative FORD. He still had some authority.

Mr. CHAYES. Yes; he directed me to gather together the files in the Department on Oswald, and to prepare a report to be available for him the first thing in the morning covering as best we could within that time span the contacts that Oswald had with the Department.

We got the passport file. We got the security office file. We got the special consular services file which covered Mrs. Oswald's visa and the repatriation loan. I think those three files were the ones that we had. It may have been there was a smaller fourth file, but I think those three were the ones.

Representative FORD. What would that smaller fourth file be?

Mr. CHAYES. I can't remember. It was duplicates if it was anything. Oh, that is right, we had a visa file and an EGS file so those were the four. The EGS file, that is Special Consular Services in the office, in the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs.

Representative FORD. You got this order on or about 5 o'clock the 22d of November?

Mr. CHAYES. The 22d; yes, sir.

Representative FORD. And you issued orders to have these files brought in, or did you go and get them yourself?

Mr. CHAYES. No.

Representative FORD. Or what happened?

Mr. CHAYES. I issued orders to have them brought in. I called—I am trying to think how we got them. [Turning to Mr. Ehrlich.] Did you go down and get them? Mr. Ehrlich and Mr. Lowenfeld, another of my people, we worked through the night on this, the three of us all together and it may be that the two of them went down to get them. I don't think we just called over the telephone and asked them to be brought up.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. CHAYES. It is my recollection that one of these two gentlemen, either

Testimony of Abram Chayes
Legal Advisor, Dept. of State
Warren Commission, Vol 15 pp 342-343

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state Dept. employee

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